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Just cognition: Scientific research on bias and some implications for 
legal procedure and decision-making 
 
 
Gary Edmond† and Kristy A. Martire* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Judges are expected to be impartial. Traditionally, common law judges have been concerned about bias and 
even the appearance of bias. Bias is believed to threaten the administration of justice and the legitimacy of 
legal decision-making, particularly public confidence in the courts. This article contrasts legal approaches 
to bias with a range of biases, particularly cognitive biases, familiar to scientists who study human 
cognition and decision-making. What this research reveals is how narrowly judges have conceived the 
biases that threaten legal decision-making. Judges have insisted that some potential sources of bias are not 
open to review and maintained the idea that they are peculiarly resistant to bias through legal training and 
judicial experience. This article explains how, notwithstanding express concern with bias, there has been 
limited legal engagement with many risks known to actually bias decision-making. Through examples, and 
drawing upon scientific research, it questions legal approaches and discusses the implications of more 
empirically-based approaches to bias for decision making and institutional legitimacy.  
 
Keywords: impartiality, judging, adjudication, cognitive science, psychology, recusal  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Judges in all legal traditions have concerned themselves with bias and partiality.1 Bias, 
really the appearance of factors considered by judges (and others) as potentially biasing, 
is conceived as a threat to the legitimacy of both legal proceedings and outcomes. Indeed, 
impartiality has been considered so fundamental to the administration of justice, and 
partiality (or bias) so disruptive, that judges in common law systems developed rules and 
procedures to insulate legal institutions and practice from bias and even perceptions of 
bias. Curiously, alongside this sensitivity to bias and its institutionally destabilizing 
potential, common law judges developed the idea that they are peculiarly resistant to bias. 
Through their legal training, experience, inclinations and efforts, judges – we are told – 
have become exceptional. They are, according to prevalent judicial perspectives, able to 
resist the kinds of biases, prejudices and predispositions that frequently contaminate the 
decision-making (and cognition) of ordinary citizens. This article questions traditional 
legal approaches to bias, particularly judicial exceptionalism and the restrictive way 
judges have characterised bias and attendant dangers. 
 With these legal concerns and commitments foregrounded, this article aims to 
introduce legal decision-makers to scientific insights on cognitive bias. We aim to 
introduce the kinds of biases and heuristics that tend to influence all human decision-
making.2 Drawing on scientific research, we contend that judges are likely to be 
                                                        
† Professor, School of Law, UNSW. We thank Leighton McDonald, Ros Dixon, Mathew Groves, Mark 
Aronson, Adrian Zuckerman and two insightful referees for their feedback. Research was supported by 
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1 See e.g. John Tarrant, Disqualification for bias (Federation Press, 2012) 19-32. A classical norm was 
captured in the phrase nemo judex in sua causa (nobody is to be judge in their own cause). 
2 Heuristics are ‘rules of thumb’ that generally help us to make good decisions in fast and frugal ways. 
See G. Gigerenzer and P. Todd, Simple heuristics that make us smart (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). See also D. Kahnemann, Thinking fast and slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,  
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vulnerable to many, and perhaps all, of the biases that influence ordinary human 
cognition.3 From the outset it is important to note that cognitive biases are more common 
and more expansive than traditional legal conceptions of bias. Cognitive biases are not 
limited to having an interest in or obtaining a benefit from a specific outcome (be it actual 
or apprehended). Cognitive biases operate automatically and unconsciously and are not 
necessarily overcome by training, experience or effort. They are, in consequence, 
ubiquitous and insidious. This article explores the role and implications of biases that are 
quick and effortless – that is, biases unconsciously shaping our perceptions, problem 
solving and decision-making. Remarkably, given anxieties about the corrosive potential 
of even the appearance of bias, few common law judges have publicly engaged with 
research on cognitive bias and its implications for traditional legal models of 
adjudication, prevailing commitment to special judicial abilities, or the effectiveness of 
legal procedures. 
 Cognitive biases would appear to influence perceptions and interpretations at every 
stage of legal proceedings – from the identification of a cause of action, the collection of 
evidence, the framing and presentation of the issues, to the analysis of law and evidence. 
This article is, however, primarily focused on bias in judicial decision-making. It begins 
with two examples of cognitive bias in non-legal professional decision-making contexts, 
followed by a discussion of judicial bias. We use cognitive science as a foil to explore 
these approaches, before moving to consider biases and their implications with particular 
application to legal decision-making. Ultimately, the article explains why cognitive 
biases are important, and consequently, why we should study their impact on judicial 
performance and, where appropriate, develop empirically-based responses (e.g. training 
and revised procedures) to protect decision-makers from actual biases that threaten the 
fairness and accuracy of proceedings and public confidence in our legal institutions. 
 
 
2. Two non-legal examples 
Because lawyers and judges have developed narrow conceptions of bias, and seem to 
believe they possess special abilities (e.g. heightened scepticism and the ability to 
overcome potentially biasing influences), we have elected to begin this article with non-
legal examples of cognitive bias in the hope that the experiences of decision-makers in 
other domains might help to cast light on the potential vulnerability of legal practices, 
commitments and rationales. Let’s begin with the selection of musicians.4 
 
A. Selecting the best musicians 
Until relatively recently the New York Philharmonic Orchestra selected musicians on the 
basis of a competitive audition before a selection panel.5 The eminent panel was 
                                                                                                                                                              
2011). 
3 See e.g. S. Redfield (ed.), Enhancing Justice: Reducing Bias (American Bar Association, 2018); E. 
Cunliffe, ‘Judging Fast and Slow: Using Decision-Making Theory to Explore Judicial Fact 
Determination’ (2014) 18 International Journal of Evidence & Proof 139 and more generally R. Thaler 
and C. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2008). 
4 Another revealing example concerns the abilities of wine connoisseurs. See e.g. G. Morrot, F. 
Brochet and D. Dubordieu, ‘The Color of Odors’ (2001) 79 Brain & Language 309; D. Valentine et al, 
‘What’s in a wine name? When and why do wine experts perform better than novices?’ (2000) 36 
Abstracts of the Psychonomic Society 5. 
5 This account is based on research by C. Goldin, and C. Rouse, ‘Orchestrating Impartiality: The 
Impact Of ‘Blind’ Auditions On Female Musicians’ (2000) 90 American Economic Review 715-741. 
See also D. Neumark, R. Bank and K. Van Nort, ‘Sex discrimination in restaurant hiring: An audit 
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composed of experienced musicians, composers, conductors and patrons. No one 
suggested that those involved in selection were anything but well-suited to the task and 
firmly committed to both the excellence and vitality of the orchestra. The majority of 
those involved in selection were themselves experts or connoisseurs. The musicians 
recruited in this way were disproportionately male. This over-representation continued 
over time, even as the number of applicants who were women (or from minority groups) 
began to more closely resemble broader societal demographics, and as the cultural 
advantages once available to white males (e.g. privileged access to formal training) 
slowly equilibrated. Now, the over-representation of males could be because male 
musicians are (inherently) superior to female musicians.6 The alternative is that selectors 
were making decisions that were biased in favour of male applicants. 
 Eventually, as the over-representation of males became sociologically conspicuous, 
the New York Philharmonic decided to experiment with a different method of selection. 
The new procedure was designed to eliminate or reduce bias against women (and some 
minorities and music schools). The Philharmonic introduced ‘blind’ auditions.7 That is, 
the gender (and race and school) of the applicant was shielded from the panel through the 
use of a curtain or pre-recording (or some other form of non-disclosure).8 The selection 
panel was forced to make an assessment on the only relevant criterion – the ability of the 
performer. Following this procedural innovation the proportion of female musicians 
selected began to rise. Slowly, the composition of the orchestra began to more closely 
resemble the demographics of applicants and the broader society. The results of blind 
audition seem to confirm that the previous process was systematically, if unintentionally, 
biased by factors unrelated to the quality of the audition. Selection panels had not been 
able to control, overcome or interrogate their prejudices, even as gender disparities 
became conspicuous and socially untenable.  
 It is important to emphasise that prior to the introduction of blind auditions none of the 
selectors perceived themselves, or their panels, to be biased. They believed that they were 
making decisions on the basis of raw ability or merit. These decision-makers seemed to 
be oblivious to the fact that their decisions were systematically shaped by a factor (here 
gender) that was not in a simple relationship with the quality of musicianship and 
performance. Moreover, for a while, the dominance of male musicians was perceived and 
understood as directly correlated to ability – and implicitly natural.9 All of the panels (and 
panel members) could offer plausible explanations for the selection of predominantly 
male musicians based on merit.10 And yet the results of blinding suggest that the prior 
                                                                                                                                                              
study’ (1996) 111 Quarterly Journal of Economics 915; M. Betrand and S. Mullainathan, ‘Are Emily 
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination’ (2004) 94 American Economic Review 991. 
6 Historical over-and under-representation in certain roles (whether judges, slaves, or professors) is 
usually easier to explain sociologically – e.g. in terms of opportunity and support – rather than 
biologically – i.e. invoking innate abilities. 
7 The Boston Symphony Orchestra apparently began experiments with blind auditions in 1952 and 
other groups eventually followed. Such blinding is now popularly embodied in popular media, such as 
The Voice. The original program, The Voice of Holland, first aired in 2010. 
8 It turned out that there was also a need for carpets as the sounds of shoes, as applicants walked on the 
stage behind the screen, provided strong hints about gender. 
9 See e.g. S.J. Gould, The mismeasure of man, 2nd ed. (WW Norton, 1996); S. Jasanoff, ‘Future 
imperfect: Science, Technology and the imaginations of modernity’ in S. Jasanoff and S. Kim (eds), 
Dreamscapes of modernity: Sociotechnical imaginaries and the fabrication of power (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015) 1. 
10 Such considerations might have direct application to judicial selection, interpretive claims about 
merit and excellence, and the over-representation of particular groups. We leave judicial selection for 
another occasion.  
 4 
selection was biased in a manner that was not directly correlated with ability. Even as 
selectors became aware of the gender disparity, particularly in response to changing 
social expectations, they still encountered interpretative difficulties when not blinded.11  
 The example of musician selection is revealing in terms of the following discussion. It 
suggests that biases might be a problem for decision-makers even when acting with the 
best intentions. The example also suggests that being experienced or expert in some 
domain (whether music and perhaps law), and even being aware of dangers to cognition 
(e.g. an awareness of the over-representation of males), may not be sufficient to 
counteract insidious effects. Many biases (and heuristics) operate automatically or 
unconsciously such that decision-makers may not be aware of their influence and thus 
incapable of consciously ‘overpowering’ them. Indeed, the dangers are such that 
individuals and groups may even develop justifications – such as appeals to the natural 
order, or intrinsic merit, in our example – for the biased outcomes they unwittingly re-
produced. Significantly, decision-makers (and others) may come to understand the world 
in terms of such outcomes, such that biased decision-making may perpetuate perspectives 
and beliefs that are not based in reality.12 The contention that males are better musicians 
is much more difficult to maintain once it has been shown that those with perceptual 
abilities (i.e. the selection panel) are generally incapable of determining the gender of a 
performer in blind auditions.13 
 
B. Forensic scientists and contextual information 
Our second example concerns forensic science evidence, specifically latent fingerprints. 
On Thursday, 11 March 2004, four Spanish commuter trains were bombed. Almost 200 
people were killed and around 2 000 injured.14 Among the debris investigators located a 
latent fingerprint on an unexploded bomb. Images of the fingerprint were sent to a range 
of fingerprint examiners, including those at the FBI Latent Print Unit.15 There, a search of 
the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) produced a list of 
candidate fingerprints for comparison. These prints were analyzed by an FBI fingerprint 
examiner. The examiner made an identification, matching the latent fingerprint to a US 
citizen, Brandon Mayfield, whose fingerprints were stored on the IAFIS database. The 
Unit chief and a contracted ‘verifier’ reviewed the images and confirmed the 
identification.  
 Mayfield was an attorney from Portland, Oregon. He was married to an Egyptian 
immigrant, had converted to Islam, and was linked to suspected terrorists through his 
representation of a convicted terrorist in a child custody matter. Mayfield was arrested 
and held in custody as media interest in a possible American suspect intensified. He 
denied involvement. In preliminary criminal proceedings the United States Attorney’s 
Office requested a copy of the latent fingerprint print for the purpose of an independent 
re-examination. The latent fingerprint from Spain was again identified to Mayfield. 
                                                        
11 These are obviously influenced by other social and performative considerations. On changes in 
understanding, consider J. Johnson, Listening in Paris: A cultural history (UC Press, 1995) and T. 
DeNora, Beethoven and the construction of genius (Cambridge: CUP, 1995). 
12 This might help to explain the persistence of mistaken beliefs in a variety of domains, from witch 
trials to contemporary miscarriages of justice. 
13 See also A. Turing, ‘Computing machinery and intelligence’ (1950) 59 Mind 433. 
14 J. de Ceballos, F. Turégano-Fuentes, D. Pérez-Diaz, M. Sanz-Sanchez, C.  Martin-Llorente, and J. 
Guerrero-Sanz, ‘11 March 2004: The terrorist bomb explosions in Madrid, Spain–an analysis of the 
logistics, injuries sustained and clinical management of casualties treated at the closest hospital’ (2005) 
9 Critical Care 104.  
15 R. Stacey, ‘A report on the erroneous fingerprint Individualization1 in the Madrid train bombing 
case’ (2004) 54 Journal of Forensic Identification 706. 
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 Two days later, on 19 May 2004, the Spanish National Police advised the FBI that 
they had identified the latent fingerprint to Ouhnane Daoud, an Algerian national. The 
FBI reviewed Daoud’s prints and withdrew its identification of Mayfield.16 The US latent 
fingerprint examiners had all been wrong. Mayfield was not the source of the latent print, 
their systems had failed and a very public error had been made. The US government 
dismissed the criminal proceedings against Mayfield and he was released from prison. 
Eventually Mayfield received a formal apology and was awarded $2 million in 
compensation. Yet the damage was done. Both Mayfield and the reputation of fingerprint 
evidence suffered irreparable losses. Identification by fingerprint had become (publicly) 
fallible.17 
 It is against this backdrop that a now notorious study was conducted examining the 
potential role of contextual bias (or context effects) in forensic science decision-
making.18 Contextual bias is where our perceptions and interpretations of objects and 
events are influenced by factors in the environment that are unrelated to the specific 
decision at hand.19 Researcher Itiel Dror wanted to know whether contextual information 
about the Mayfield case could lead fingerprint examiners to change how they viewed and 
interpreted a pair of matching fingerprints. At some point in 2004, following the Mayfield 
misidentification, Dror and his colleagues recruited five fingerprint examiners with 85 
years of combined experience to participate in a study. The examiners would not know 
when the study would take place or what it entailed. Indeed, they would not even know 
that they had actually participated until the study was over. 
 For the purposes of the study, a pair of fingerprints – one latent fingerprint and one 
reference fingerprint – was prepared for each of the five examiners. More importantly, in 
each case the prints were drawn from the specific examiner’s own casework history. Four 
years earlier (in 2000) each of the examiners had concluded that these prints matched.20 
The examiners were shown the prints again as part of Dror’s study, but were not told that 
they had previously declared them to match. Instead, in each case a colleague presented 
the examiner with the pair of fingerprints explaining that they were the prints that had 
been erroneously matched by the FBI in the Madrid train bombing – this is the contextual 
information.21 The fingerprint examiner was then invited to examine the ‘Mayfield’ prints 
– this is the data or evidence – and provide an assessment. The results of this modest 
experiment rocked the forensic sciences across the world. Of the five examiners only one 
was able to resist the powerful contextual suggestion that the two prints did not match – 
maintaining his original judgement. One expert concluded that there was now insufficient 
information to support a judgement either way – notwithstanding the fact that they had 
                                                        
16 For a review of the FBI’s handling of the Brandon Mayfield case, see United States Department of 
Justice, A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (US Department of Justice, 
Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division, 2006).  
17 Generally, see S. Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification 
(Harvard University Press, 2001). 
18 I. Dror, D. Charlton and A. Péron, ‘Contextual information renders experts vulnerable to making 
erroneous identifications’ (2006) 156 Forensic Science International 74. 
19  For a discussion in a forensic context see G. Edmond, J. Tangen, R.  Searston, and I. Dror, 
’Contextual bias and cross-contamination in the forensic sciences: the corrosive implications for 
investigations, plea bargains, trials and appeals’ (2015) 14 Law Probability and Risk 1.  
20 Two independent examiners were asked to review the prints for the purpose of the study and 
declared that each pair of prints matched. The question of whether the prints used in this study actually 
match is less important than the examiners’ responses when re-presented with prints they had 
previously matched.  
21 Here, the context is suggestive, but misleading. Context information, such as the criminal record of 
the suspect, should make no difference to the question of whether two fingerprints match or do not 
match (or are not sufficient to match). 
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previously been deemed sufficient for comparison and identified. The three remaining 
experts directly contradicted their previous identification by reporting that the prints were 
non-matching.  
 While validation studies suggest that qualified fingerprint examiners possess genuine 
expertise in fingerprint comparison, and perform the task with a high degree of 
accuracy,22 this study demonstrates the corrosive power of suggestive contextual 
information – including misleading information.23 The qualifications and expertise of the 
participants in this study were unimpeachable, the research method was robust and 
realistic. Yet, information that was irrelevant to the visual comparison was sufficient to 
cause three of five examiners to reverse their decision.24 They no longer believed what 
they saw. Moreover, the changed interpretation was not trivial. Even though the 
appearance of the fingerprints had not changed four of the examiners radically changed 
their interpretation. Context effects like this one have now been reproduced in many 
different forensic science domains including DNA mixture interpretation,25 the 
interpretation of crime scenes,26 blood pattern analysis,27 forensic anthropology,28 and 
forensic psychology.29  
 Concerns about the bias caused by contextual information in the forensic sciences 
have now been expressed by authoritative scientific organisations including the National 
Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Institute of 
Science and Technology (NIST), the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST), the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS), the Royal Societies of London and Edinburgh and the Forensic Science 
                                                        
22 B. Ulery, R. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia and M. Roberts, ‘Repeatability and reproducibility of decisions by 
latent fingerprint examiners’ (2012) 7 PloS one e32800; B. Ulery, R. Hicklin, J. Buscaglia and M. 
Roberts, ‘Accuracy and reliability of forensic latent fingerprint decisions’ (2011) 108 Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 7733; J. Tangen, M.  Thompson and D. McCarthy ‘Identifying 
fingerprint expertise’ (2011) 22  Psychological Science  995. 
23 Unfortunately, in practice we do not always know if contextual information is accurate. 
24 Such materials are sometimes described as ‘domain-irrelevant information’. That is, they are not 
required to undertake the task – here latent fingerprint comparison. And, of vital importance, domain 
irrelevant information may introduce serious dangers to interpretation and decision-making. 
25 I. Dror and G. Hampikian, ‘Subjectivity and bias in forensic DNA mixture interpretation’ (2011) 51 
Science & Justice 204. 
26 C. van den Eeden, C. de Poot and P. Van Koppen, ‘Forensic expectations: Investigating a crime 
scene with prior information’ (2016) 56 Science & Justice 475. 
27 N. Osborne, M. Taylor, M. Healey and R. Zajac, ‘Bloodstain pattern classification: Accuracy, effect 
of contextual information and the role of analyst characteristics’ (2016) 56 Science & Justice 123. 
28 S. Nakhaeizadeh, I. Dror and R. Morgan, ‘Cognitive bias in forensic anthropology: visual assessment 
of skeletal remains is susceptible to confirmation bias’ (2014) 54 Science & Justice 208. 
29 D. Murrie, M. Boccaccini, L. Guarnera and K. Rufino, ‘Are forensic experts biased by the side that 
retained them?’ (2013) 24 Psychological Science 1889. For a review of forensic confirmation bias see 
S. Kassin, I. Dror  and J. Kukucka, ‘The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and 
proposed solutions’ (2013) 2 Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 42. 
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Regulator (UK).30 Alongside this critical attention, strategies are now being developed 
and implemented to manage the effects of bias on experienced forensic practitioners.31 
 
 
3. Legal approaches to partiality, pre-judgment and their appearances  
Concerns about bias and even the appearance of bias are abiding anxieties of modern 
independent judiciaries tasked with the resolution of disputes. Indeed, the risk of bias and 
its apprehension have led common law judges to develop a range of rules and procedures 
intended to manage dangers in ways that encourage public confidence in the courts and 
the administration of justice. In this section it is our intention to provide some sense of 
the rather limited ways in which common law judges have approached and understood 
bias. We might characterise these as legally-recognised biases. In doing so, we have 
drawn quite liberally on the jurisprudence of superior common law courts. Rather than 
attempt to synthesize or reconcile the jurisprudence, it is our intention to provide an 
indication of predominant concerns, assumptions and responses. 
 In common law systems ideas about bias are derived from the exigencies of litigation 
and the collective experience of judges.32 Modern concerns with bias are said to emerge 
from one of the two central precepts of natural justice. The first precept requires that 
persons whose rights or interests might be affected by a decision should be notified and 
afforded an opportunity to participate in the process before a decision is made. The other 
precept concerns bias and is sometimes described as the bias rule, the rule against bias or, 
as in the following extract, the ‘apprehension of bias principle’. 
 
The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the 
basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even 
the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be 
undermined.33 
 
                                                        
30 National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
(National Academies Press, 2009); Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, 
Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach 
(US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012); President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Forensic Science in Criminal Proceedings: Ensuring 
Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (Executive Office of the President of the United 
States, 2016); and W. Thompson et al, Forensic Science Assessments: A quality and gap analysis – 
Latent fingerprint examination (AAAS, Washington DC, 2017).  
31 Sequential unmasking is one such strategy where the facts surrounding the decision are progressively 
revealed. See D. Krane, S. Ford, J. Gilder, K. Inman, A. Jamieson, R. Koppl, L. Kornfield, M. 
Risinger, N. Rudin, M. Taylor and W. Thompson, ‘Sequential unmasking: a means of minimizing 
observer effects in forensic DNA interpretation’ (2008) 53 Journal of Forensic Sciences 1006. This 
approach has subsequently been updated to include a linear component to balance competing context 
management and opinion revision considerations. See I. Dror, W. Thompson, C. Meissner, I. 
Kornfield, D. Krane, M. Saks, and M. Risinger, ‘Context management toolbox: A Linear Sequential 
Unmasking (LSU) Approach for minimizing cognitive bias in forensic decision making’ (2015) 60 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 1111. 
32 Though, some of these ideas pre-date our particular institutions and might be considered part of the 
consciousness, or common sense, in western intellectual traditions. In recent years, managerial judging 
and more interventionist case management may have created new risks. See e.g. J. Resnik, ‘Managerial 
judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 364 and A. Zuckerman, ‘Truth finding and the mirage of 
inquisitorial process’, paper presented at the Evidential Legal Reasoning World Congress, Girona (6-8 
June, 2018). 
33 Ebner v Official Trustee (2000) 205 CLR 337, 345. Lon Fuller refers to the fundamental need for a 
neutral umpire, in ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard LR 353. 
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Whatever the precise nomenclature, judges are expected (and assumed) to be impartial.34 
This requires that they approach decisions ‘with an open mind that is free of prejudgment 
and prejudice’.35 The English Court of Appeal defined bias as ‘a predisposition or 
prejudice ... unconnected with the merits of the issue.’36 Another definition, from the 
High Court of Australia, takes the conceptualisation even further insisting that bias need 
not actually lead to an error, rather that ‘bias, whether actual or apparent, connotes the 
absence of impartiality.’37 A judge should make decisions on the basis of relevant and 
admissible evidence (applied to the relevant law in a procedurally orthodox fashion). Bias 
may cause practices and decisions to depart, or be perceived to depart, from these 
expectations. In theory and practice judges (and many other public decision-makers) are 
required to be unbiased. That is, they should rationally evaluate relevant evidence and 
disregard – and not be influenced by – extraneous considerations.38  
 Common law judges have identified two types of bias – actual and apprehended. 
Actual bias is where the decision-maker has a closed mind or prejudges the case. In such 
circumstances the judge may not be appropriately persuaded by relevant and admissible 
evidence, usually because of some interests, conduct, associations or exposure to 
extraneous information.39 In Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties the English Court 
of Appeal explained (in gendered terms) that ‘proof of actual bias is very difficult, 
because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge about extraneous 
influences affecting his mind’.40 Even where a judge has a conspicuous interest in the 
proceedings, or is otherwise conflicted, it can be difficult to demonstrate actual pre-
judgment or partiality.41 Because of this difficulty, in conjunction with the expectation 
that courts are expected to be independent and impartial, concerns about bias extend 
beyond actual bias to the appearance of bias.  
 Apprehended bias is concerned with how others might assess the circumstances in 
which the judge is acting.42 The following formulation is representative: 
 
A judge should not ... hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain 
a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the 
resolution of the question involved in it.43 
                                                        
34 In Republican Parry of Minnesota v White, 536 US 765, 775-777 (2002), Scalia J refers to three 
different meanings of impartial. These are ‘a lack of bias for or against’ a party, a ‘lack of 
preconception in favour of or against a particular legal view’, and ‘open-mindedness’. It was Scalia’s 
assessment that the second was ‘virtually impossible’, but the first and third were sufficient. This 
position was described by Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of Australia, as ‘unquestionably right’ 
in ‘Judicial independence in Australia: Contemporary challenges, future directions’, R. Ananian-Welsh 
and J. Crowe (eds), Judicial Independent in Australia (Federation Press, Sydney, 2016) 7, 9-10. 
35 M. Groves, ‘The Rule against bias’ (2009) Hong Kong Law Review 485, 486. It is not necessarily a 
mind that has not thought about, or even written about, the subject matter: R v Commonwealth 
Conciliation & Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, 554. 
36 Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1117, [28]; Imperial Oil Ltd v 
A-G of Quebec (2003) 231 DLR (4th) 577, [28]; Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 
CLR 70, 100; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507, 
[72]. 
37 Ebner, 348; Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 All ER 731, [23]. 
38 For reasons explained below, notorious threats must be at least as important as appearances. 
39 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41. There may also be procedural failings. 
40 Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [1999] EWCA Civ 3004; [2000] QB 451, [3]. 
41 That is, to identify how the interest, for example, overtly subverts the fairness process or the 
decision(-making). Things are difficult because the evidence is often capable of supporting a range of 
interpretations. Though, actual bias is occasionally inferred, see e.g. Sun v Minister for Immigration & 
Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71, 134-135. 
42 R v Huggins [1895] 1 QB 563, 656. 
43 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288, 293-294 (italics added). 
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Proving actual bias requires evidence that a judge is not open-minded and responsive to 
admissible evidence. Apprehended bias is less demanding, requiring only that an observer 
‘might conclude there was a real possibility that the decision-maker was not impartial.’44 
 Because apprehension of bias is a broader category than actual bias and much easier to 
establish – based as it is on appearances and impressions – most of the concerns, 
challenges and jurisprudence are directed toward the apprehension of bias.45 In cases 
where a judge is vulnerable to an allegation of bias (e.g. because of a close relationship 
with a party or significant financial interests in the outcome of the dispute) it will usually 
lead to voluntary recusal.46 Although, there are countervailing resource and institutional 
pressures on judges not to recuse themselves too readily and not to allow parties – 
particularly ‘repeat players’ – to exert influence by attempting to manipulate who 
presides over specific cases.47 
 In terms of determining whether a judge is or appears biased, all common law courts 
have developed formal tests. The modern instantiation of these tests is often located in the 
House of Lord’s response to a decision by the Lord Chancellor in Dimes v Grand 
Junction Canal Proprietors (1852). Lord Cottenham affirmed a decision on appeal 
without disclosing a personal interest – his ownership of a substantial parcel of shares 
whose value was directly related to the outcome of the suit. When the unsuccessful party 
became aware of the Lord Chancellor’s interest he appealed. When the case eventually 
came before the House of Lords, the panel explained: 
 
No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be, in the remotest degree, influenced by the interest 
he had in this concern; but, my Lords, it is of the last importance that the maxim that no man is to be 
a judge in his own cause should be held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which he 
is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest. … And it will have a most salutary 
influence on these tribunals [inferior courts] when it is known that this high Court of last resort, in a 
case in which the Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that his decree was on that 
account a decree not according to law, and was set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior 
tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest, 
but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an influence.48 
                                                        
44 Groves, ‘The rule against bias’, 494. See also Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357. Both parts are potentially 
quite complicated. One of the issues that has garnered attention is the level of knowledge, about law and the 
facts, that the ‘fair minded ... observer’ should be assumed to possess. 
45 It has the institutional benefit of allowing judges (and lawyers making allegations) to avoid the more 
professionally insidious claims of actual bias. A request for recusal on the basis of the appearance of 
bias may require a trial judge to address the issue even where there is no suggestion of any actual bias. 
Consider the recusal application made to the Commissioner during the Trade Union Royal Commission 
in Australia. About half way through the application the following submission was advanced by senior 
counsel for the ACTU: ‘I know you understand it, but for the benefit of everyone else, I, at no point in 
these submissions, are suggesting that you [are] actually biased’. D. Heydon, ‘Reasons for ruling on 
disqualification applications’ Trade Union Royal Commission (2015), [26] available at: < 
https://www.tradeunionroyalcommission.gov.au/Hearings/Documents/2015/Evidence31August2015/R
easonsforRulingonDisqualificationApplicationdated31August2015.pdf> (accessed on 5 September 
2018). 
46 G. Hammond, Judicial recusal: Principles, process and problems (Hart, 2009). Contrast conflict of 
interest in other domains, where the acceptance of free pens, note pads and meals have been shown to 
bias the prescribing behaviour of doctors: S. Krimsky, ‘Small Gifts, Conflicts of Interest, and the zero-
Tolerance Threshold in Medicine’ (2003) 3 American Journal of Bioethics 50. 
47 See e.g. the opinion of Justice Scalia in Cheney v US District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 US 
913 (2004). 
48 Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 HL Cas 759 (1852) 10 ER 301. (italics added) 
The Lord Chancellor died the year before this decision was handed down. See also Earl of Derby’s 
case (1614) 12 Co Rep 114 and City of London v Wood (1702) 12 Mod 669. 
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The decision, like much of the ensuing jurisprudence, implies that the Lord Chancellor 
was not actually biased, and was implicitly capable of resisting the influence of his 
substantial financial interest. It was the panel’s concern with legal legitimacy, and the 
unfortunate appearances, that required intervention. Subsequently, the Dimes approach 
was applied strictly such that any pecuniary interest in a matter under consideration 
disqualified a judge from hearing the case. Over time the rigour has been relaxed 
(particularly in Australia) in response to the increasingly complex social circumstances 
(especially, around financial interests and professional relations) in which contemporary 
judges find themselves.49 
 We can observe a tempering of the strict approach from Dimes and ensuing decisions 
in Ebner v Official Trustee, where the High Court of Australia consolidated a series of 
decisions in the provision of a more refined test for the apprehension of bias. The Ebner 
test is composed of two parts. 
 
First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case 
other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an 
articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of 
deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in 
litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and 
the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is 
articulated.50 
 
Such tests are to be applied by the trial judge (themselves) or by an appellate court (on 
review) adopting the perspective of an imagined ‘fair-minded lay observer’, familiar with 
the key elements of the case. Those reviewing the issue are to consider whether, from the 
perspective of such an observer, the judge ‘might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced 
mind to the resolution of the question’.51 That is, would there be a ‘reasonable 
apprehension on the part of a fair-minded and informed observer’?52 Would such an 
observer accept that the decision-maker acted with an open mind and was responsive to 
the evidence adduced? Would perceived conflicts and perceived interest, perhaps 
including non-pecuniary interests, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias?53 Most 
common law jurisdictions now apply similar tests where allegations of bias arise.  
 While judicial independence and impartiality are seen as fundamental to socially-
legitimate judging, there is widespread (and unavoidable) recognition that judges come to 
                                                        
49 Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] Q.B. 451. English courts tended to use ‘the real 
likelihood of bias’ test from R v Bath Compensation Authority (1925) 1 KB 685, approved by the 
House of Lords in Frome United Breweries Co Ltd v Bath Justices (1926) AC 586, 591; R v 
Cambourne Justices; Ex Parte Pearce [1955] 1 QB 41, 47. This test had more of a subjective flavour 
than Australian formulations: Metropolitan Properties Co (FCG) Ltd v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577, 599-
602. In R v Gough (1993) AC 646, 670, the House of Lords approved a test focused on a real danger of 
bias ‘to ensure that the courts is thinking in terms of possibility rather than probability of bias’. This 
involved more than a minimal risk: R v Inner West London Coroner; Ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 4 All 
ER 139, 151. See the discussion in J. Sackar, ‘Disqualification of judges for bias’, paper presented at 
the University of Oxford (January 2018) and empirical analysis in S. Buhai, ‘Federal Judicial 
Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis’ (2011) 90 Oregon Law Review 69. 
50 Ebner, [8]. 
51 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, [11]; Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada 
(National Energy Board), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 394. 
52 Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 74. According to Webb, the main categories of bias are 
interests, conduct, associations and exposure to extraneous information.  
53  R v Bow St Magistrate Ex parte Pinochet (No 2) [2001] 1 AC 119 (concerning Lord Hoffman’s 
association with Amnesty International). 
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the bench with a range of perspectives, experiences, values and beliefs.54 Indeed, judicial 
diversity may enhance legal legitimacy. Judges are expected to bring these different 
perspectives, experiences, values and beliefs to their practice and decision-making. 
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, ‘impartiality does not require that the judge 
have no sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free to entertain 
and act upon different points of view with an open mind.’55 Even so, recognition of 
variation in backgrounds, perspectives, experiences, values and beliefs may introduce 
tensions between ideas such as justice being blind (and frequently blindfolded in 
symbolic representations), the expectation that cases should be treated consistently, and 
the requirement that judges ‘must act only on the evidence adduced by the parties and 
must not act upon information acquired otherwise.’56 Such expectations may be difficult 
to satisfy in practice, regardless of how they manifest in judicial performances on the 
bench and in reasons produced for public consumption. 
 
 
4. Bias(ed) jurisprudence 
For the purposes of this article and discussion we have selected four aspects of legal 
engagement with bias that might be considered salient and perhaps revealing. They are: 
(a) the widespread contention that judges are peculiarly resistant to the kinds of biases 
and prejudices that influence ordinary decision-makers – let’s call this judicial 
exceptionalism; (b) the procedure used, at first instance, to review recusal applications 
(and here we might include, by analogy, admissibility decisions by judges acting as the 
tribunal of fact) – judicial insight; (c) factors that, for English courts at least, appear to be 
formally exempted from consideration in recusal applications and treated as not exerting 
potentially biasing effects – formal exemptions; and (d) the almost exclusive legal 
concern with visible forms of bias – so-called bias optics. In the context of this article, 
drawing upon cognitive science evidence, these procedures and assumptions are 
revealing. 
 This article is not especially interested in intentional bias, particularly when covert.57 
Rather, it focuses on a range of biases, some subtle and unconscious, that threaten the 
perception and cognition of decision-makers acting with the best intentions. Indeed, one 
of the most salient findings from the scientific study of biases is that many biases operate 
even where decision-makers are endeavouring to function, and believe they are 
functioning, with impartially and integrity. 
 
A. Judicial exceptionalism 
Most models of judging suggest that judges are capable of disregarding irrelevant and 
unfairly prejudicial information and suggestive procedures. The contention that judges 
are superior to other professional and non-professional groups in their ability to overcome 
                                                        
54 Ordinary ‘inclinations of mind’ will not be sufficient: R v Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546. On this subject, see L. Barnes 
and K. Malleson, ‘Lifting the judicial identity blackout’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
357. 
55 R v S (R.D.), [1997] 3 SCR 484, [35]. See the discussion in M. Groves, ‘Empathy, experience and 
the rule against bias in criminal trials’ (2012) 36 Criminal Law Journal 84, 100-101. 
56 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng, [179]. 
57 This may be difficult to identify and is very difficult to manage. We focus on inadvertent and 
unconscious biases because all responsible judges should be interested in improving the dispensation of 
justice. 
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such influences – to ‘detach’ themselves so to speak – is repeatedly asserted by judges.58 
The following are exemplary: 
 
Where the decision-maker is a judicial officer the fair-minded observer will have regard to the fact 
that a judicial officer’s training, tradition and oath or affirmation equip the officer with the ability to 
discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial ... Thus judges are expected to be equipped 
by training, experience and their oath or affirmation to decide factual contests solely on the material 
that is in evidence together with other material which is notorious or common knowledge. ... 
Counsel Assisting pointed to the words of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in Helow v Home Secretary 
[2008] 1 WLR 2416 at 2422 [23]: ‘Even lay people acting as jurors are expected to be able to put 
aside any prejudices they may have. Judges have the advantage of years of relevant training and 
experience.’59 
 
The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by 
the judges to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by 
reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse their minds of any 
irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions. ... At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an 
impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not hesitate 
to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of a litigant for apprehending 
that the judicial officer for whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial.60 
 
It is the duty of a judge to put out of mind irrelevant or immaterial matters, particularly those of a 
prejudicial character. Knowledge by a judge of such matters goes nowhere towards establishing a 
real danger of bias.61 
 
These taken for granted or ‘assumed’ abilities seem to be foundational to the judicial role 
and the dispensation of justice. According to a former Chief Justice of Australia, ‘to be 
judicial is to be impartial’.62 Lord Justice Balcombe wrote that bias is ‘the antithesis of 
the proper exercise of a judicial function’.63And yet, notwithstanding the demands and 
breathtaking hubris associated with such assertions, there is little independent support for 
such abilities.  
 From a cognitive science perspective biases are predispositions and preferences that 
affect judgement and decision-making. They can be thought of as the cognitive 
equivalent of a reflexive knee-jerk; they occur quickly, effortlessly and automatically. 
Biases are strategies that ‘are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to 
systematic and predictable errors’.64 That is, biases are decision-making styles that do not 
necessarily incorporate what might be understood as rational (or legally normative) 
approaches to relevant admissible evidence, and they can influence how information is 
processed, prioritized and evaluated. Decades of research has identified not only a 
                                                        
58 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568, 570-1. It is interesting to contrast influential claims, or really 
norms, among the scientists. See more generally, R. Merton, (edited by Storer NW), The sociology of 
science: theoretical and empirical investigations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); I 
Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1974) and M. Mulkay, ‘Norms and 
Ideology in Science’ (1979) 4 Social Science Information 637. 
59 Heydon, ‘Reasons for ruling on disqualification applications’ (2015). See also Isbester v Knox City 
Council [2015] HCA 20. For an early modern version of such sentiments, see M. Bacon, A new 
abridgement of the law (1736) Vol 2, 431. 
60 President of the Republic of South Africa v South Africa Rugby Football Union, 1999(4) S.A. 147, 
177. 
61 Locabail, [61].  
62 M. Gleeson, The rule of law and the Constitution (ABC Books, 2000) 129. 
63 Bahai v Rashidian [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1337, 1342H, 1346F. 
64 A. Tversky, and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’ (1974) 185 
Science 1131; G. Gigerenzer and P. Todd, Simple heuristics that make us smart (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
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seemingly endless array of different types of bias, but confirmed their ubiquity and 
influence irrespective of a person’s profession, experience or intelligence.65 
 Revealingly, the extant research involving judges as participants has shown that being 
a judge does not necessarily protect against bias.66 Englich, Mussweiler and Strack, for 
example, found that experienced judges were susceptible to anchoring effects.67 This term 
describes a bias whereby incidental numeric information – that is neither necessarily 
admissible nor relevant – can affect subsequent numerical estimates thereby ‘anchoring’ 
or tethering decision-makers to an initial value.68 In one study involving a single case 
vignette, judges and prosecutors were asked to make a sentencing decision following 
exposure to either a high prosecution sentencing demand or a low prosecution sentencing 
demand to see if these would operate as ‘high’ and ‘low’ anchors. Those judges who 
received the high anchor issued higher sentences for the defendant (mean 6.5 months) 
than those who received a low sentencing demand (mean 4 months).69 This effect was 
replicated even when the anchors were provided in the form of a question to the judge 
from a reporter speculating about the high or low possible sentence, and when the anchor 
was in the form of a number rolled from a dice by the judge.70 
 Judges have also been found to be susceptible to expectancy effects like those 
described in the context of musician selection and fingerprint examination. The formative 
studies in this general area explored the biasing effect of expectations on human 
perceptions of animal performance. Study participants were given either ‘maze-bright’ or 
‘maze-dull’ rats to train in completing a maze.71 As one might expect, ‘bright’ rats were 
observed to be significantly better maze learners than ‘dull’ rats. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, the labels ‘bright’ and ‘dull’ had been randomly assigned. There were no 
actual differences between ‘bright’ and ‘dull’ rats in their aptitude for maze learning. The 
only difference between the participants was their expectations concerning the rats – 
based on the (misleading) information presented to them. The expectations of participants 
were sufficient to produce differences in the way they perceived and reported maze 
learning by the rats. Since this initial demonstration, the effect of expectations on 
                                                        
65 T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and biases: The psychology of 
intuitive judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
66 J. Rachlinski, S. Johnson, A. Wistrich and C. Guthrie, ‘Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?’ 
(2009) 84 Notre Dame Law Review 1195; C. Guthrie, J. Rachlinski and A. Wistrich, ‘Inside the 
Judicial Mind’ (2001) 86 Cornell Law Review 777 J. Rachlinski, A. Wistrich, and C. Guthrie ‘Altering 
attention in adjudication’ (2012) 60 UCLA Law Review 1586; C. Guthrie, J. Rachlinski, and A. 
Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the bench: How judges decide cases.’ (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 1. 
67 B. Englich, T. Mussweiler and F. Strack, ‘Playing dice with criminal sentences: The influence of 
irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision making’ (2006) 32 Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 188. See also J. Rachlinski, A. Wistrich, and C, Guthrie ‘Can judges make reliable numeric 
judgments: distorted damages and skewed sentences’ (2015) 90 Indiana Law Journal 695. 
68 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’ (1974) 185 
Science 1131. 
69 B. Englich, T. Mussweiler and F. Strack, ‘Playing dice with criminal sentences: The influence of 
irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision making’ (2006) 32 Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 188.  
70 See M. Bennett, ‘Confronting cognitive anchoring effect and blind spot biases in federal sentencing: 
A modest solution for reforming a fundamental flaw’ (2014) 104 The Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 489 for a detailed consideration of anchoring in the context of judicial decision-making 
broadly, and federal sentencing specifically. The example with the dice is not too far removed from the 
parody associated with Judge Bridglegoose in F. Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532-1552) 
Book 3, Ch 3, xxxix. 
71 R. Rosenthal and K. Fode, ‘The effect of experimenter bias on the performance of the albino rat’ 
(1963) 8 Systems Research and Behavioral Science 183. 
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outcomes has been replicated in literally hundreds of studies.72 Studies in legal settings 
have shown that judicial beliefs about the guilt of the defendant materially influence the 
instructions provided to jurors, and that this in turn affects verdicts.73  
 The effects of bias have proven resistant to expertise,74 occupation,75 authority,76 
intelligence and styles of thinking.77 Thus, the independent scientific evidence does not 
on its face support the contention that judges are resistant to or better able to manage 
(cognitive) bias than others.78 Self-interested and institutionally-reinforcing declarations 
(and beliefs) have a long legal pedigree, but age, frequency of repetition and level of 
acceptance hardly constitute proof of their validity against the backdrop of empirical 
evidence.  
 The issue of special judicial abilities emerges conspicuously in relation to the 
management and evaluation of information. Judges are assumed to be able to identify 
relevant information, resist irrelevant information and to avoid the influence of unfairly 
prejudicial information whether admissible or inadmissible.79 But, if judges are not 
actually better, and presumably much better than ordinary persons, at resisting the 
influence of a range of cognitive biases (particularly the influence of irrelevant or unfairly 
prejudicial information)80, then many traditional claims about fairness, procedural 
legitimacy and even the rectitude of some decisions might be open to question – like the 
opinions of the fingerprint examiners in our example. Judicial decisions may be 
improperly influenced, even determined, by factors other than (admissible) evidence and, 
notwithstanding appearances and representations, procedures may not actually be fair. If 
judges are not genuinely exceptional then their human frailties may be highly corrosive to 
some of the many activities they are routinely engaged in. Cognitive biases may 
undermine claimed impartiality and may even threaten public confidence in the courts. 
On this point it is important to recognise that judges have a great deal of experience 
avoiding the appearance of partisanship and bias. That, however, is very different to 
avoiding being consciously or unconsciously biased. Claims about abilities and 
                                                        
72 R. Rosenthal, and D. Rubin, ‘Interpersonal expectancy effects: The first 345 studies’ (1978) 1 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 377. 
73 R. Rosenthal, ‘Covert communication in laboratories, classrooms, and the truly real world’ (2003) 12 
Current Directions in Psychological Science 151. 
74 R. Guilbault, F. Bryant, J. Brockway and E. Posavac, ‘A meta-analysis of research on hindsight bias’ 
(2004) 26 Basic and Applied Social Psychology 103. 
75 A. Furnham and H. Boo, ‘A literature review of the anchoring effect’ (2011) 40 Journal of Socio-
Economics 35; J. Lammers and P. Burgmer, ‘Power increases anchoring effects on judgement’ 35 
Social Cognition 40. 
76 J. Lammers and P. Burgmer, ‘Power increases anchoring effects on judgement’ (2017) 35 Social 
Cognition 40. 
77 R. West, R. Meserve and K. Stanovich, ‘Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind 
spot’ (2012) 103 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 506. 
78 For an interesting exception see A. Wistrich, C. Guthrie, and J. Rachlinski, ‘Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information-The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding’ (2004) 153 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1251. Although subject to several biases, there was no evidence that judges 
in this study were vulnerable to hindsight biases in the context of a ‘probable cause’ assessment – 
though there was evidence of hindsight bias in the context of an ‘appeal’ decision. The authors suggest 
that judges may have had other heuristics or decision strategies in place that helped them to avoid 
hindsight bias in one context but not the other. This variability in the appearance of bias reinforces the 
importance of research examining actual bias among judges. 
79 This can be especially difficult where judges are unable to agree on whether some issue or evidence 
is (logically or legally) relevant. See e.g. R v Smith [2001] HCA 50 and Evans v The Queen [2007] 
HCA 59. 
80 Wistrich et al, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information-The Difficulty of Deliberately 
Disregarding’. 
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performances on the bench (or in formal reasons) reveal little about the kinds of biases 
and risks raised in this article or the threat they actually pose to decision-making. 
 There are few reasons to believe that experienced judges are likely to be more 
resistant, or less susceptible, to the range of biases, predispositions and potentially 
misleading heuristics that influence other humans.81 There is little evidence that legal 
training or experience somehow enables judges (or lawyers) to transcend biases.82  
 
B. Judicial insight 
The second issue focuses on the opportunity, afforded to the impugned decision-maker, 
to personally assess recusal applications.83 This may make institutional sense in terms of 
resourcing, and recusal applications may catch the majority of legally-insidious biases 
raised by the parties or others. For, sensible judges will recuse themselves if they believe 
there is a danger that they might be vulnerable when viewed against jurisdictional 
standards, such as the tests outlined in Dimes and Ebner, along with evolving social 
mores. There are, however, few reasons to believe that judges are in a particularly good 
position to assess their ability to act impartiality or to evaluate how others might interpret 
their ability to act impartially.84 
 Just as healthy individuals are incapable of overpowering physiological reflexive 
behaviors, so too it is unlikely that judges and jurors can overcome – or ‘disabuse’ 
themselves of – bias in most instances.85 Research on participants’ awareness of, and 
insight about, bias draws attention to what is known as the bias blind spot. This is, in 
effect, a bias about biases.86 Specifically, the bias blind spot leads us to believe that we 
are less susceptible to cognitive, social and motivational biases than others.87 We tend to 
believe that we are able to identify our biases – despite the fact they are automatic and 
unconscious – and we incorrectly conclude that when we cannot perceive a bias it is 
because no bias is present. By contrast, because we can often readily attribute the 
potential for and effects of bias to others, we frequently conclude that they are more 
                                                        
81 The contention that judges are exceptional is, in essence, an empirical question and can only be 
credibly addressed through well-designed studies. These might review specific features of (past) 
judicial performances or formally evaluate abilities through tests in controlled conditions. See e.g. A 
Wistrich, J. Rachlinski and C. Guthrie, ‘Heart versus head: Do judges follow the law of follow their 
feelings’ (2014) 93 Texas Law Review 855. 
82 Most lawyers and judges do not receive detailed training about bias and cognition.  
83 Wistrich et al, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information’. 
84 Consider Baroness Butler-Sloss’ response to the controversy over her appointment to investigate 
allegations of an establishment pedophile ring following revelations that her brother-in-law (Sir 
Michael Havers) had, as Attorney-General, been involved in decisions not to prosecute individuals who 
may have been involved (e.g. Sir Peter Hayman). In initially rejecting calls to stand down, she is 
reported to have said: ‘I know absolutely nothing about it. … If people think I’m not suitable, then 
that’s up to them.’ The implied impression was that ignorance rendered her impartial. She eventually 
withdrew, presumably because of appearances. See M. Holehouse, and M. Evans, ‘Brother of child 
abuse inquiry judge Elizabeth Butler-Sloss was accused of “cover up”’’, The Telegraph (9 July 2014) 
and P. Wintour, ‘Butler-Sloss: Victims should not run child abuse inquiry’, The Guardian (Australia) 
(31 Decemeber, 2014). 
85 Although some have cautiously suggested that intentional efforts to manage bias can be successful 
in some circumstances – particularly where the potential for bias has been made explicit to the 
decision-maker. See Rachlinski et al, ‘Does unconscious racial bias affect trial judges?’.  
86 E. Pronin, D. Lin and L. Ross, ‘The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others’ (2002) 
28 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 369. 
87 R. West, R.  Meserve and K. Stanovich, ‘Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind 
spot’ (2012) 103 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 506. 
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biased.88 Other studies of significance to judicial decision-making (e.g. in recusal 
applications) have shown that participants consider that they are less likely to engage in 
victim blaming, and anticipate that they will be less affected by self-interest, than others. 
However these beliefs are not borne out by the data. Rather ‘knowledge of particular 
biases in human judgment and inference, and the ability to recognize the impact of those 
biases in others, neither prevents one from succumbing, nor makes one aware of having 
done so.’89 
 Those who believe themselves to be less biased than others generally are not. Neither 
cognitive ability, nor styles of thinking (i.e. a preference for analytical examination and 
open-mindedness) are associated with greater insight into cognitive predispositions. 
Intelligence does not protect us and does not increase the accuracy of introspection. What 
is more, even accurate perceptions of our own bias are generally insufficient to correct 
them.90 In this context, merely knowing is not enough and the dangers associated with 
incorrectly believing oneself to have immunity can be serious. Thus, awareness of the 
risk of bias and even familiarity with specific biases does not necessarily enable a 
decision-maker to avoid the dangers.91 Significantly, other professional groups (e.g. 
scientists, biomedical researchers and engineers) have not been able to avoid their 
insidious effects. Cognisant of risks through systematic evaluation of their performances, 
they have developed special rules and procedures (e.g. double blind clinical trials) to 
avoid them.92 
 In addition to the observed limits of introspecting about bias, there are practical 
contingencies that might restrict full and frank self-reflection. An unsuccessful recusal 
application will require the judge – who heard and denied the application – to be 
particularly careful in their subsequent performance (e.g. treatment of parties and 
counsel) and in the provision of reasons for any decision(s) in the related proceedings. 
Allowing the impugned judge to decide might even accentuate biases (whether 
consciously or unconsciously), even though appearances are likely to be carefully curated 
                                                        
88 In ‘Unconscious judicial prejudice’ (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 676 at 681, Keith Mason 
(former President of the NSW Court of Appeal) refers to a meeting where the judges met to consider a 
draft of the address for the opening of the Royal Courts of Justice in 1882. The original draft stated that 
‘Your Majesty’s Judges are deeply sensible of their own many shortcomings.’ Jessell MR objected on 
the grounds that such an awareness would render him ill-suited to sitting on the bench. Apparently 
Lord Justice Bowen suggested that the draft be amended to record that the judges were ‘deeply sensible 
of the shortcomings of each other.’ 
89 See Pronin et al, ‘The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others’, 378. In a recent 
relevant example, a survey of forensic scientists revealed that of those who believed that bias was a 
problem in forensic sciences (71%), 1 in 5 believed it was not a concern in their domain. Of those who 
believed bias was a problem in their domain (52%), 1 in 3 believed they were not affected by it. See J. 
Kukucka, S. Kassin, P. Zapf, and I. Dror, ‘Cognitive bias and blindness: A global survey of forensic 
science examiners’ (2017) 6 Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 452. 
90 R. West, R.  Meserve and K. Stanovich, ‘Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind 
spot’ (2012) 103 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 506. 
91 There is some evidence, discussed below, that conscious effort may improve performance. But see 
Caperton v AT Massey Coal Co., 129 S Ct 2252, 2263-4 (2009). Indeed, a judge’s reasons in recusal 
applications might be considered irrelevant, see British American Tobacco v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 
283, 309. 
92 See e.g. C. Robertson and A. Kesselheim (eds), Blinding as a Solution to Bias: Strengthening 
Biomedical Science, Forensic Science, and Law (Academic Press, 2016); A. Jadad et al, ‘Assessing the 
quality of reports of randomized clinical trials: Is blinding necessary?’ (1996) 17 Controlled Clinical 
Trials 1. 
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through especially civil performances and detailed and otherwise legally defensible 
reasons.93 
 The limits of introspection, along with the dangers of contextual influences like those 
shaping the selection of musicians and interpretations by fingerprint examiners, would 
appear to have application to many areas of judicial practice. Such issues arise where the 
same person is both the admissibility gatekeeper and the ultimate fact-finder at trial. In 
these circumstances the trial judge is expected to simply disregard inadmissible and 
legally irrelevant information – to act as though they were not aware of the information – 
and, in the absence of explicit evidence to the contrary, assumed to have done so. 
Empirical evidence suggests that this is very difficult to achieve.94 
 
C. Formal exemptions 
The third issue is closely related to claims about judicial exceptionalism. In this case 
some appellate courts have gone as far as deeming specific personal attributes as 
effectively out of bounds.95 These are usually implicit, although in Locabail the English 
Court of Appeal explained that it could not ‘conceive of circumstances in which an 
objection could be soundly based on the religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, 
class, means or sexual orientation of the judge.’96 By virtue of judicial fiat these attributes 
are off-limits. They are presented as incapable of disrupting the practice of impartial 
judging. The Locabail Court continued: 
 
Nor, at any rate ordinarily, could an objection be soundly based on the judge’s social or educational 
or service or employment background or history, nor that of any member of the judge’s family; or 
previous political associations; or membership of social or sporting or charitable bodies; or Masonic 
associations; or previous judicial decisions; or extra-curricular utterances (whether in textbooks, 
lectures, speeches, articles, interviews, reports or responses to consultation papers); or to previous 
receipt of instructions to act for or against any party, solicitor or advocate engaged in a case before 
him; or membership of the same Inn, circuit, local Law Society or chambers.97 
 
These additional factors are merely ‘ordinarily’ not open to being raised as grounds of 
(apprehended) bias. There may be institutional, resource and policy reasons for placing 
these (kinds of) issues off-limits or presumptively off-limits.98 Though, the question of 
whether any of these claims and assumptions are sustainable can only be answered 
empirically. On the available evidence the Court of Appeal’s boundary work, rendering 
some issues off-limits, is open to question, if not directly controvertible. It is difficult to 
reconcile with scientific (and sociological) research.99 
 As the foregoing discussion suggests, judges are not immune to bias, nor have they 
been reliably shown to be able to manage or mitigate its effects through awareness, 
                                                        
93 Review of recusal applications by appellate courts will tend to be impressionistic and declaratory, 
focused on appearances, resource implications and institutional traditions, but typically insensitive to 
scientific research and largely incapable of assessing bias, whether actual, apparent or unconscious. 
94 N. Steblay, H. Hosch, S. Culhane and A. McWethy, ‘The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction 
to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis’ (2006) 30 Law and Human Behavior 469. 
95 This goes well beyond the recognition that judges come to the bench with a past. See Barnes and 
Malleson, ‘Lifting the judicial identity blackout’. 
96 Locabail, [25]. 
97 Locabail, [25]. The judgment notes that where these cast doubt, as in the case or extra-judicial 
writings, there may be a basis. 
98 Although the precise boundaries may be controversial as the Pinochet and S (R.D.) cases make clear. 
See also Hoekstra (2000) JC 391 and the partial explanation offered in Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 
528, [60]. 
99 Consider, as one prominent example, the feminist judgment project: R. Hunter et al (eds), Feminist 
judgments: from theory to practice (Hart: Oxford, 2010). 
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introspection and experience.100 As understood from a cognitive science perspective, 
biases have the potential to operate outside our attentional control and against our explicit 
intentions.101 Thus, it is difficult to imagine the particular strategies, skills or capabilities 
that judges could employ to swim against the well-established tide of biases associated 
with gender, age, race and religion in human decision-making. The available evidence not 
only suggests that there is a general tendency to hold non-neutral positions across dozens 
of topics including, but not limited to, age, race, sexual preference, weight, and religion; 
but, in addition, these views affect perception and decision-making in significant ways.102  
 Earlier we explained how the gender bias associated with orchestra selection persisted 
despite the best intentions of selectors (and conscious efforts to redress inequality). We 
also observed how a ‘match’ bias arising from outcome expectancies in fingerprint 
comparison materially affects the decision-making of experts, even in the face of 
significant collateral consequences (e.g. mis-identification and wrongful conviction). 
Positive or negative views developed across the spectrum of human experiences, be they 
personal or professional, change expectations and therefore the way we interact with and 
understand the world.103 These effects should not be sidelined merely because they are 
‘ordinarily’ conceived (or described) as professionally insignificant. Rather, they ought to 
be acknowledged and studied and, where necessary, actively managed. 
 
D. The optics of bias 
This fourth section focuses on legal interest in visible biases and the way some of these 
‘optics’ are managed by rules and conventions among common law judges. We can see 
this clearly in examples of judges failing to live up to expectations (and being genuinely 
exceptional).  
 Notwithstanding judicial sensitivity to the issue of bias and the apprehension of bias, 
actual ‘biases’ occasionally manifest. They surfaced in Vakauta v Kelly, where an 
exasperated trial judge suggested – in open court – that the medical specialists appearing 
as expert witnesses for the insurer-defendants were partisan.104 He described the insurer’s 
doctors as: 
 
‘that unholy trinity,’ the ‘usual panel of doctors who think you can do a full week’s work without 
any arms or legs’; whose ‘views are almost inevitably slanted in favour of the [insurer] by whom 
they have been retained, consciously or unconsciously.’105 
 
                                                        
100 They may be reasonably well positioned to manage appearances because professionally and 
institutionally they are sensitive to the importance of appearing impartial. But see Rachlinski et al, 
‘Does unconscious racial bias affect trial judges’. 
101 For a useful review of implicit bias and its effects see A. Greenwald and L. Krieger, ‘Implicit bias: 
Scientific foundations’ (2006) 94 California Law Review 945. 
102 A. Greenwald, T. Poehlman, E. Uhlmann and M. Banaji, ‘Understanding and using the Implicit 
Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity’ (2009) 97 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 17; A. Greenwald and L. Krieger, ‘Implicit bias: Scientific foundations’ (2006) 94 
California Law Review 945. 
103 R. Rosenthal and D. Rubin, ‘Interpersonal expectancy effects: The first 345 studies’ (1978) 1 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 377; R. Rosenthal and K. Fode, ‘The effect of experimenter bias on the 
performance of the albino rat’ (1963) 8 Systems Research and Behavioral Science183; R. Rosenthal, 
‘Covert communication in laboratories, classrooms, and the truly real world’ (2003) 12 Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 151. 
104 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568. See also the irrelevant and intemperate interventions by Peter 
Smith J leading to his recusal, discussed in Harb v HRH Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz 
[2015] EWHC 2201, [52]. 
105 Vakauta, 571-72. Similar sentiments were expressed, perhaps less directly, many years ago by 
Jessell MR in Thorn v Worthing Skating Rink Co. (1877) 6 Ch. D. 415. 
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In their reviews of this very experienced trial judge’s disparaging commentary, the 
various courts of appeal considered the main problem to have been the public 
manifestation (and a degree of specificity), exposing the risk of (the appearance of) pre-
judgment.106 On appeal to the High Court of Australia, the majority explained that the test 
might not be extremely strict: ‘the requirement of the reality and appearance of impartial 
justice ... must be observed in the real world of actual litigation.’ To require otherwise 
would make ‘the administration of justice in personal injury cases ... all but 
impossible.’107 Nevertheless, these particular public utterances introduced the danger that 
bias might reasonably be apprehended.  
 Of significance, the attitude of the trial judge in Vakauta only seems to have become 
problematic from the point it materialized – that is, became public. Privately held views, 
in contrast, are not susceptible to consideration. It seems that if the trial judge had resisted 
the temptation to comment, and preferred the evidence of the plaintiff’s doctors in a more 
legally orthodox manner – perhaps listing the consistency between the plaintiff’s 
evidence and her doctor’s opinions, and any concessions or corroboration from the 
defendant’s experts – then the judgment might have been legally orthodox and less 
vulnerable to impeachment. That is, it would not have been impeachable in terms of bias 
even though the actual reasons for decision might have been based on actual bias or 
shaped by pre-commitments and prejudices that would warrant a re-trial had they been 
disclosed or known.108 
 This brings us to an aspect of judicial bias that remains largely unexplored (and 
unacknowledged), namely the privately held beliefs, commitments, and prejudices of 
judges.109 This realm is unexplored because appellate courts accept that judges come to 
the bench with a history and, unless there is some legal reason to believe otherwise, 
assume that a judge’s past, beliefs, and commitments do not prevent impartiality. This is 
an institutional arrangement that combines judicial exceptionalism with fostered 
ignorance.110 Indeed, institutional and professional norms operate to foster ignorance by 
discouraging judges from disclosing too much or being other than reserved in public 
settings. Consequently, in the absence of evidence of pre-commitments or publicly-
known reasons that compromise the ability to appear to act impartially in a specific case, 
a judge is deemed, or assumed to be, impartial. This applies regardless of any actual 
beliefs or prejudices a judge might hold or have held. Privately, a judge might be racist, 
misogynist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, anti-obese, elitist, libertarian or socialist. Such 
categories are not necessarily independent and the list could go on. In the absence of 
publicly available evidence of such beliefs or prejudices – even if they are only implicit – 
                                                        
106 Systematic prejudices appear to have manifested in criminal proceedings, particularly in response to 
expert witnesses called by defendants. See R. Dioso-Villa, ‘Is the Expert Admissibility Game Fixed? 
Judicial Gatekeeping of Fire and Arson Evidence’ (2016) 38 Law & Policy 54; M. Risinger, 
‘Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left in the Dock?’ (2000) 
Albion Law Review 99. 
107 Vakauta, [2]. 
108 Similar prejudices and commitments, and perhaps worse, that are not articulated do not seem to 
create a problem for legal legitimacy. To assess judicial integrity, the focus is on public behaviour and 
judicial performance (in Goffman’s sense): E. Goffman, The presentation  of self in everyday life (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1959). 
109 One of the relatively small number of articles on unconscious bias, written by a judge, refers to 
‘prejudices’ among (some of) his colleagues on the bench: Mason, ‘Unconscious judicial prejudice’. 
110 Although some jurisdictions, particularly the United States federal courts, are very sensitive to 
alignment and pre-judgment. Consider the controversy that emerged in the senate confirmation 
proceedings in response to a speech given by Sonia Sotomayor that included the following statement: 
‘I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than 
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life.’ 
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there is no scope to question, let alone challenge, judicial partiality.111 A presumption of 
impartiality operates.  
 It is no coincidence that institutional conventions (and even rules) emphasise 
moderation and cautious engagement in public activities, especially around issues or 
subjects that might be raised or litigated in the judge’s court.112 Norms of conservatism 
and detachment help courts and judges to appear impartial and to maintain public 
confidence in legal proceedings.113 However, apart from reinforcing the professional 
significance of impartiality and benefitting from its apparent absence, such norms do little 
to prevent the action of cognitive biases that may be substantially prejudicial. They do not 
necessarily address the many insidious biases notorious to scientists. 
 Typically, it is difficult to challenge judges on the basis of bias, actual or apprehended, 
because in most cases we do not have reliable insight into their actual interests, 
knowledge, assumptions, beliefs, prejudices and so forth. Other potentially biasing 
factors, which may not be easily disguised, such as age, race and gender, are ‘ordinarily’ 
off-limits.114 By exempting many judicial attributes from consideration, appellate courts 
have restricted the scope of legally-recognisable bias to appearances, publicly disclosed 
information, and the formal reasons provided by judges.115 Review tends to proceed on 
the basis that judges are not biased and not susceptible to the many biases that influence 
the cognition and decision-making of other humans. We accept that in most cases, 
presumably the vast majority of trial judges (acting on the evidence and the law) act in 
good faith, and that in the cases where they are biased, they may be oblivious to their 
prejudices and the effects of any biases.116 
 While norms against judicial participation and the expression of strident views in 
extra-curial activities are understandable, and may even be desirable, the result is that for 
many judges we have few ideas about their perspectives, values and beliefs. We do not 
know if the judges who regularly write and speak out hold views that are more or less 
vehement or partisan than those who do not. We do not know if the views of judges who 
occasionally lose their cool, such as the judge in Vakauta or the English judge whose 
luggage was misplaced by British Airways, are representative.117 Reserve, moderation 
and even silence make institutional sense, but they do not render judges – individually or 
collectively – impartial. Rather, they are conventions that help courts to manage the risk 
                                                        
111 Judges who hold strong views – modern judges who hold sexist or racist attitudes, for example – 
typically hide these commitments and explain their decisions in orthodox legal terms. We accept that in 
many cases the law and the evidence might determine the outcome, such that non-racists would agree 
with the outcome (and perhaps the public reasoning). We accept that terms such as racist and sexist are 
complex, and we are only using them here as simplistic examples.  
112 See for example: https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/judicial-conduct-and-complaints.html 
(accessed 28 July 2018) and The Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated, Guide 
to Judicial Conduct, published for The Council of Chief Justices of Australia (3rd ed, 2017). 
113 See Goffman, The presentation  of self in everyday life. See also N. Elias, The civilizing process 
(trans. Edmund Jephcott) 2 vols. (New York: Urizen Boods, 1978) vol. 2, pt. 2, ‘Synopsis: Towards a 
theory of civilizing processes’. 
114 Though, see R. Brubaker, Trans: Gender and Race in an Age of Unsettled Identities (Princeton, 2016). 
115 There is an extensive literature, particularly in the US, where issues of race have been expressly 
excluded from consideration. Consider, for example, statistical evidence on the proportion of black 
men charged and convicted in capital cases. See e.g. C. Steikert and J. Steikert, ‘The American Death 
Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race’ (2015) 82 University of Chicago Law Review 243.  
116 Some of these biases might be exposed through statistical analysis of judicial decisions. Any 
analysis, like trying to decide who is a competent surgeon, based on data from operation outcomes, will 
undoubtedly be complex. And, judging and cases may be more idiosyncratic than surgery. We suggest 
that rather than focus on, or closely monitor, individual performances, legal institutions (i.e. courts) 
should think about improving processes and awareness. 
117 See Harb v HRH Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz [2016] EWCA Civ 556, [52]-[53]. 
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of (the appearance of) bias by keeping interested parties, including ‘reasonable 
observers’, ignorant.118 And, they are not uniformly effective. These norms (along with 
their not infrequent breaches) may be an indication of the limits of judicial 
exceptionalism; particularly the difficulty of persuading non-legal audiences of special 
judicial abilities.  
 
E. Other biases that threaten legal decision-making, rationality and legitimacy 
A more comprehensive introduction to cognitive biases is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, there are many biases – not well known to law – that threaten legal 
decision-making and, unavoidably, legal institutional legitimacy. In addition to 
anchoring, expectancy effects (such as confirmation bias) and the bias blind spot – 
already described – it is useful to draw attention to hindsight bias, truth effects and 
implicit biases. 
 Hindsight bias is where our tendency to overestimate the predictability of a past event 
leads to the perception that we ‘knew-it-all-along’.119 That is, we misperceive the 
foreseeability of events. Classic demonstrations ask those who do and do not know the 
outcome of a scenario to estimate the likelihood of that outcome as though they were 
naive to the results. The robust finding is that those who know the outcome of historical 
events – football games, elections and legal cases, among other things – do not realise 
their knowledge of the outcome has increased their perception of its probability as 
compared to those who did not have the same information.120 Consequently, where an 
event is perceived as being more foreseeable after-the-fact than it was beforehand, 
perceptions of what somebody could or should have anticipated can change. This can be 
problematic, particularly in legal contexts where responsibility is determined 
retrospectively.121 Though, hindsight bias is not only relevant to liability, where 
foreseeability is an issue, it also threatens to contaminate the way judges (and others) 
interpret evidence at trial and on appeal and may make it more difficult following 
conviction to interpret evidence in ways that capture uncertainty (and doubt).122 
 Truth effects are evident where the repetition of statements (described as ‘ambiguous’ 
in the literature) automatically and unconsciously inflates perception of the truth of facts 
asserted in those statements.123 For example, the statement that ‘the zipper was invented 
in Norway’ tends to be perceived as more truthful the second time it is heard. The effect 
                                                        
118 While evidence of overt bias may provide good reason to wonder about claims of impartiality and 
exceptionalism, the lack of evidence may does not confer or prove actual impartiality. 
119 J. Rachlinski, ‘Heuristics and biases in the courts : Ignorance or adaptation’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law 
Review 61; R. Guilbault, F. Bryant, J. Brockway and E. Posavac, ‘A meta-analysis of research on 
hindsight bias’ (2004) 26 Basic and Applied Social Psychology 103; S. Hawkins and R. Hastie, 
‘Hindsight: Biased judgments of past events after the outcomes are known’ (1990) 107 Psychological 
Bulletin 311. 
120 See J. Rachlinski, ‘Heuristics and biases in the courts’ for a detailed exploration in legal contexts. 
See also R. Guilbault, F. Bryant, J. Brockway, and E. Posavac, ‘A meta-analysis of research on 
hindsight bias’. 
121 J. Rachlinski, ‘Heuristics and biases in the courts : Ignorance or adaptation’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law 
Review 61. 
122 A number of factors have been shown to moderate hindsight bias, including the type of event or 
outcome being estimated. Hindsight bias is reduced where the outcome to be estimated is positive or 
negative rather than neutral. Overall, a summary of 252 tests of the hindsight bias concluded that it is 
‘robust and well-documented, and typically persists despite attempts to eliminate it’. See R. Guilbault, 
F. Bryant, J. Brockway and E. Posavac, ‘A meta-analysis of research on hindsight bias’. For an 
exception see Rachlinski et al, ‘Does unconscious racial bias affect trial judges?’ 
123 A. Dechêne, C.Stahl, J. Hansen and M. Wänke, ‘The truth about the truth: A meta-analytic review 
of the truth effect’ (2010) 14 Personality and Social Psychology Review 238.  
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appears to be underpinned by a perceived discrepancy between the expected and 
experienced fluency with the statement over repeated presentations. The unanticipated 
familiarity we experience seems to be interpreted as an indicator of truth rather than mere 
exposure.  
 The ‘truth effect’ has been observed for a range of ambiguous statements (including 
opinions), applies to statements that are true and false, and is observed irrespective of the 
credibility of the source of the statement; though the effect is larger where the source is 
also credible.124 A recent summary of 51 studies on the topic characterised the 
phenomenon as ‘robust’ across a wide range of situations.125 In particular, the results 
suggest that repetition is a practical but subtle way to increase the perceived 
persuasiveness of a message. Though most often applied in the context of advertising, the 
value of such a strategy for persuasive advocacy is clear. Apart from the need to be 
careful about the way evidence is presented at trial, particularly in addresses by 
prosecutors and trial judges, there may be a need to focus more attention on the reliability 
of underlying procedures before ‘experts’ are allowed to express their opinions and have 
them echoed in criminal proceedings.126 
 We have already referred to implicit bias, but believe it is worth additional 
consideration given its pervasive and consequential effects. Implicit bias seems important 
given the kinds of considerations formally exempted, as in Locabail, but also because 
legal scholars and courts have struggled with bias and implicit bias as it applies to 
litigants – particularly around gender, race and religion.127 Implicit biases are attitudes or 
beliefs that affect behaviours without explicit awareness and despite attempts to prevent 
their manifestation. In short, where there is an implicit bias at play, differentiating 
characteristic(s) – e.g. the mere perception of skin color, age, sexual orientation, prior 
offending, and a raft of other factors – can quickly and automatically trigger differential 
treatment.128 Socio-legal anxieties about inconsistent treatment provide the basis for 
antidiscrimination laws, and the legal commitment to formal equality before the law. 
Interestingly, there seems to be limited interest in extending these concerns to the 
                                                        
124 A. Dechêne, C.Stahl, J. Hansen, and M. Wänke, ‘The truth about the truth: A meta-analytic review 
of the truth effect’ (2010) 14 Personality and Social Psychology Review 238. 
125 Dechêne et al, ‘The truth about the truth’. 
126 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Report No 325, 
2011). See generally, Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2012). 
127 M. Banaji and A. Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden biases of good people (New York, NY: Delacorte 
Press, 2013). See the discussion of implicit bias in legal contexts C. Jolls, and C. Sunstein, ‘The law of 
implicit bias’ (2006) 94 California Law Review 969; J. Kang and K. Lane, ‘Seeing through 
colorblindness: Implicit bias and the law’ (2010) 58 UCLA Law Review 465; J. Levison and R. Smith 
(eds), Implicit racial bias across the law (Cambridge, New York, 2012); E. Girvan, ‘On using the 
psychological science of implicit bias to advance anti-discrimination law’ (2015) 26 UCLA 1. On 
prominent US decisions, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507 (2015). Consistent with judicial exceptionalism, US courts have been much more willing, in 
recent years, to consider overt bias among jurors in serious criminal cases, see Tharpe v Sellers, 583 
US (2018); Pena-Rodriguez v Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
128 Greenwald et al, ‘Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test’; A. Greenwald and L. 
Krieger, ‘Implicit bias: Scientific foundations’ (2006) 94 California Law Review 945. Such differential 
treatment is notorious amongst investigators, see e.g. B. Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing without 
permission (New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2017). 
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perceptions and performances of judges. That is, for the implicit beliefs and reactions of 
judges to be scrutinized, mitigated or managed.129 
 
 
5. Debiasing and Mitigation 
A range of strategies have been suggested to mitigate or remove the potential effects of 
bias.130 Given the ubiquity of biases and limited legal acknowledgement or engagement 
with cognitive science research, we believe there are responses that might strengthen both 
the perceived and actual impartiality of courts. 
 
A. Introspection 
In his The Rule of Law, in response to the fact that judges do not bring a ‘blank canvas’ to 
decision-making, Lord Bingham suggests that judges ‘should seek to alert themselves to, 
and so to neutralize, any extraneous considerations which might bias their judgment.’131 
However, it is important that we make it clear to the reader that appointment to the bench 
is not among the evidence-based strategies known to ameliorate or effectively manage the 
impact of bias on decision-making. We have already seen that there is little evidence of 
exceptionalism for the educated, the analytical, the intelligent, the insightful or the expert. 
Unfortunately, simply knowing about the existence of a bias is generally insufficient 
protection.132 Even so, awareness is a sensible first step.133 From there on, however, 
active steps – known as cognitive forcing strategies – are required to eradicate or mitigate 
the effects of bias.134  
 
B. Cognitive forcing strategies 
A forcing strategy is a mechanism or procedure specifically introduced to interrupt 
reflexive cognitive responses. Forcing strategies operate in a number of different ways 
and might be selected and adapted in response to specific concerns or risks. They include 
replacement and insulation strategies as well as more generic interventions designed to 
improve decision-making. 
 Replacement is a conceptually simple forcing strategy that is likely to be highly 
effective for mitigating and managing bias, but which may be practically challenging to 
implement. The basic idea is to substitute a decision-maker who has the potential to be 
biased in favor of their own (or some identifiable) interests, with either uninterested 
parties, groups of decision-makers, or both. By changing the relationship between the 
decision-maker and the decision, and by including additional decision-makers, biasing 
effects may be diluted or cancelled out, thereby minimizing their potentially deleterious 
effect on outcomes. 
                                                        
129 Implicit biases, like those distorting the selection of musicians (along with controvertible claims 
about merit), might help to explain the apparent difficulty of well-intentioned individuals and 
institutions nominating a wider pool of candidates for senior judicial office. 
130 P. Croskerry, ‘The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies to minimize them’ 
(2003) 78 Academic Medicine 775; Jolls and Sunstein, ‘The law of implicit bias’. 
131 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011) 93. See also David Neuberger, ‘Judge not, that ye be 
judged: Judging judicial decision-making’ (FA Mann Lecture, London 29 January 2015), [29] 
<www.supremecourt.uk/- docs/speech-150129.pdf>. 
132 J. Rachlinski, ‘Heuristics and biases in the Courts : Ignorance or adaptation’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law 
Review 61; A. Furnham and H.  Boo, ‘A literature review of the anchoring affect’ (2011) 40 Journal of 
Socio-Economics 35.  
133 See Rachlinski et al, ‘Does unconscious racial bias affect trial judges?’. 
134 P. Croskerry, ‘The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies to minimize them’ 
(2003) 78 Academic Medicine 775. 
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 One replacement-style reform, already in inconsistent use, is the use of a second judge 
(or panel) to make decisions.135 This might be done when the judge is required to assess 
their own performance, ability and level of conflict – as in recusal applications – or in 
circumstances where the trial judge is the tribunal of fact and there are attempts to limit 
exposing the decision-maker to irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial information (that is not 
admissible).136 By using this type of procedure, courts reduce their reliance on the 
affected party to make judgements with implications for their own credibility and 
standing – whether as a judge in their own case, or being able to ignore unfairly 
prejudicial suggestion, or implicit biases – and instead call upon a separate and relatively 
unaffected party to make the decision.  
 By way of hypothetical example, it would be possible to take this approach even 
further and use a special jury to make recusal decisions.137 The basic issues in any recusal 
application will never be so complex that they require long periods of time to present or 
decide, and using a jury has the advantage of producing a quick decision without detailed 
reasons. Such a procedure could be restricted to several hours before the jury is asked to 
decide whether they apprehend some non-trivial potential for bias. A key benefit of such 
a reform is that public input – rather than judicial impressions of reasonable persons – 
would inform and perhaps discipline judicial behavior.   
 Insulation involves depriving the decision-maker of irrelevant (or gratuitous) 
information. Deprivation can be absolute, as in the case of blinding, or partial. One 
prominent form of partial insulation is known as linear sequential unmasking (LSU). This 
is a forcing strategy that works by protecting the decision-maker from potentially biasing 
information, and may involve releasing information as it is required and as preliminary 
decisions (based on available relevant information) have been documented.138 LSU can 
be applied to a range of conditions where irrelevant (or not yet relevant or admissible) 
information might contaminate reasoning and decision-making; as is the case with the 
anchoring and expectation biases already discussed. For example, knowledge that a 
suspect has confessed to a crime sets a clear expectation that crime scene samples and 
those obtained from the suspect will ‘match’. This in turn increases the likelihood that a 
forensic practitioner analysing the crime scene samples (e.g. fingerprints or DNA 
profiles) will see the anticipated similarities and discount any differences as merely 
apparent or artefactual – thereby creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.139 This has been 
demonstrated with DNA profiles (and occurred in the fingerprint example in our 
introduction). Shielding the practitioner from the potentially corrosive information (e.g. 
                                                        
135 See e.g. Dwr Cymru Cyfynedig v Albion Water [2008] EWCA Civ 97 and El Farargy v El Farargy & 
others [2007] 2 FCR 711, 725. Some jurisdictions in the United States employ a separate judge for pre-trial 
decision-making 
136 See discussion in 
http://www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Publications/Speeches/2018%20Speeches/Sa
ckar20180116.pdf; Wistrich et al, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information’. 
137 We are not advocating such a procedure, although it might help to make judges publicly accountable 
for their claims about impartiality and special abilities. We appreciate that procedural reforms have a 
range of complications, but if impartiality is genuinely essential, then these kinds of structural 
responses might be required. 
138 Krane, et al, ‘Sequential unmasking’ and I. Dror, W. Thompson, C, Meissner, I. Kornfield, D. 
Krane, M. Saks, and M. Risinger, ‘Context management toolbox: A Linear Sequential Unmasking 
(LSU) Approach for minimizing cognitive bias in forensic decision making’ (2015) 60 Journal of 
Forensic Sciences 1111. 
139 The tendency to overvalue evidence that supports one’s expectations and undervalue evidence that 
contradicts them is specifically termed a ‘confirmation bias’, see S. Kassin, I. Dror and J. Kukucka, 
‘The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and proposed solutions’ (2013) 2 Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 42. 
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the confession, the identity of the suspect or information about whether two fingerprints 
match) prevents them from automatically and unconsciously incorporating domain 
irrelevant information into their evaluations; thereby biasing the conclusion.  
 A process similar to LSU  – a task reordering procedure – has been proposed to reduce 
anchoring in the context of federal sentencing decisions in the United States.140 By 
simply reviewing factors in the presentencing report other than those in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, the judge can prevent the Guidelines acting as a tether that may 
limit their discretion regarding the length and severity of sentences.141 The opposite effect 
might be stimulated by an exclusive, or initial, focus on the Guidelines. 
 It turns out that awareness of unconscious biases, and the use of procedural 
mechanisms to eliminate or mitigate them, is not uncommon beyond the courts. 
Biomedical researchers and physicists, for example, routinely apply procedures to 
insulate interpretations and decisions from a range of dangers. The obvious example is 
the double-blind clinical trial: where both the patient and the treating physician are 
deprived of the information as to whether a specific patient is receiving the drug being 
tested or a placebo (or some other comparator).142 This approach was developed because 
studies demonstrated that highly-trained physicians and biomedical scientists were 
incapable of resisting the influence of information when trying to conceal the deception 
or impartially analyze the empirically-derived data. To complicate matters, the human 
subjects being studied in clinical trials often respond to their own impressions (whether 
consciously or unconsciously), such that the placebo effect is a potentially major 
confounder.143 These sorts of professional-lay interactions may have analogies in judge-
jury interactions. Though, problems with bias are not limited to disciplines engaged with 
human subjects. Physicists studying complex mathematical data sets in order to detect 
gravitational waves, for example, have developed elaborate procedures to prevent those 
trying to identify patterns from mistakenly attributing significance to ‘noise’.144 
 Other forcing strategies that address risk factors for bias include those that reduce 
reliance on memory, simplify task requirements, minimize time pressures, require explicit 
consideration of alternatives, and incorporate rapid reliable feedback on performance.145 
Ultimately, the point is that bias mitigation needs to be active and intentional. Passive 
acceptance of the existence of bias is not an effective way to interrupt a cognitive reflex. 
Appointment to the bench does not create a blank slate upon which only relevant 
admissible evidence will imprint itself.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
A. Focusing on appearances rather than notorious biases 
The previous sections might be read to suggest that judges are excessively concerned 
with the appearance of impartiality. Conventional concern with impartiality tends to be 
based on narrowly conceived risks, particularly those that are readily identifiable by 
                                                        
140 Bennett, ‘Confronting cognitive anchoring effect and blind spot biases in Federal sentencing. 
141 Permitted in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
142 B. Bausell, Snake oil science: The truth about complimentary and alternative medicine (Oxford, 
OUP, 2007).  
143 S. Epstein, Inclusion: The politics of difference in medical research (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2007). 
144 For a revealing example from gravitational wave research, see H. Collins, Gravity’s Ghost: 
Scientific Discovery in the Twenty First Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
145 P. Croskerry, ‘The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies to minimize them’ 
(2003) 78 Academic Medicine 775. Guthrie et al, ‘Blinking on the bench’. 
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litigants and the public. It includes bias inferred from interests (e.g. financial interests), 
conduct, associations or exposure to extraneous information. These are potentially serious 
threats to decision-making, but the traditional legal focus could hardly be considered 
exhaustive or adequate. Many other risks, notorious in other areas of professional and 
social practice, seem not to have been considered or are simply deemed to be beyond the 
scope of legal consideration – out of bounds, so to speak. Little attention has been 
directed to the wide range of cognitive biases that, while perhaps not as conspicuous, 
directly threaten perception, interpretation and decision-making.  
 Our concern is not that traditional legal concerns are entirely misguided, but rather that 
the traditional horizon has been conceived too narrowly. Although, related claims about 
special judicial traits, particularly the ability to transcend (cognitive) biases, appear, in the 
absence of demonstration, to be overstated or implausible. Scientific research suggests 
that human decision-makers are vulnerable to influences that are much more subtle than 
those traditionally recognised in our rules, procedures and jurisprudence. And, if judges 
are not exceptional or not known to be exceptional, then there are few reasons to believe 
that they are capable of resisting, potentially subtle, threats to cognition. Cognitive biases 
and the risks they pose are not, as our earlier examples indicate, necessarily trivial. 
 Our review drew attention to English jurisprudence that placed some issues out of 
bounds. Under the pretext of exceptionalism, Locabail enumerates and seeks to inoculate 
issues, commitments, beliefs and assumptions that are likely to surreptitiously influence 
the way individuals – including judges – perceive the world and make decisions. Rather 
than declaratory lists based on the impressions of senior judges, our rules and 
jurisprudence should be informed by scientific research, with sensitivity to 
discrimination, policy and resource implications, accuracy, institutional integrity and the 
values and demographics of our evolving social democracies.  
 
B. Engagement with scientific research (and the limits of judicial awareness) 
It might be suggested that common law judges, through their collective experience as 
lawyers and judges, are aware of the kinds of concerns raised in this article. We contend 
that such a claim is untenable on the available evidence – particularly our review of the 
prevailing jurisprudence. There is little evidence in our rules, jurisprudence and practice, 
and no systematic institutional engagement, with the kinds of research and effects we 
have described.146 The occasional reference in submissions and judgments tends to be 
treated superficially against the backdrop of judicial exceptionalism and centuries of legal 
experience.147 Indeed, the persistence of judicial exceptionalism suggests that common 
law judges are basically ignorant about cognitive biases. The alternatives are that they do 
not accept the scientific research and its implications or, perhaps as alarming, consider 
themselves unable to do anything meaningful.148 It might also suggest that legal and 
judicial experience can actually impede interest in scientific knowledge as well as 
understanding.  
                                                        
146 We accept that there are some writings, but these are quite sporadic and not entirely consistent with 
prevalent commitments and rules of procedure and jurisprudence. See e.g. among the Australian judges 
K. Mason, ‘Unconscious judicial prejudice’; P. McClellan, ‘Who is telling the truth? Psychology, 
common sense and the law (2006) 80 ALJ 655; G. Pagone, ‘Centipedes, liars and unconscious bias’ 
(2009) 83 ALJ 255. See also S. Bunn et al, ‘Unintentional Bias in Court’ (2015) 512 PostNote 1 
(Houses of Parliament, UK). We appreciate that some judges (and others) have become attentive to 
issues around cognition, but there have been few institutional responses beyond education. 
147 There are a few references to specific biases in judgments, but these could hardly be considered to 
be engaged. Generally they operate as inoculation. 
148 We might expect principled justification for non-engagement or the perpetuation of exceptionalism. 
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 Once upon a time those selecting musicians did not believe their choices were biased. 
Similarly, latent fingerprint examiners (and other forensic scientists) once believed that 
they were immune from the influence of domain irrelevant information – based on their 
long training and experience. They were mistaken. To their considerable credit, these and 
many other groups have begun to reform their practices in order to avoid real, though 
insidious, risks. There have, in contrast, been no systematic attempts by judges or law 
reform bodies to consider the implications of cognitive science on legal procedures, ideas 
of impartiality, the practice of judging and decision-making, or even the traditional 
conception of a common law judge.149 
 As we have endeavoured to explain, several common law assumptions and practices 
appear difficult to reconcile with mainstream scientific knowledge. In many cases the 
main justifications for continuing legal indifference would appear to be self-serving 
assertions about judicial abilities that have never been independently verified. This is 
unfortunate because biases shape our cognition in ways that may be insidious and may 
not be corrected through deliberation. This means that we, and this includes barristers and 
judges, cannot necessarily think our way around them. 
 
C. Strength of the evidence versus bias (and the appearance of unconscious biases) 
Biases shape how individuals understand the world. They influence perception and the 
assessments of facts, narratives, the experiences and options available to others, the 
credibility of witnesses, the significance of demeanour, the plausibility of accounts and 
motives, and the reasonableness of behaviours (by real and imaginary citizens). Biases 
may lead judges to make admissibility and interlocutory decisions that make it harder to 
prove or resist particular positions. And, biases might lead a well-intentioned judge to 
award more or less damages, or to sentence higher or lower than a less (or differently) 
biased judge might or to set a cascade of other biases or biased decisions in motion.150  
 At the same time we should not get carried away. It is important and appropriate to 
recognise that if it turns out that judges are influenced by the kinds of biases and 
heuristics that infect the decision-making of ordinary humans, their humanity will not 
necessarily corrupt all decisions and all decision-making. In some cases, such as where 
the evidence is compelling or the law clear, such biases might not make significant 
practical differences. Clear law and strong evidence might even constrain strong 
prejudices and unconscious biases (as well as those privately held). However, in most 
cases, there will be multiple occasions where cognitive biases might subtly influence the 
interpretation of law and evidence, the operation of procedures and decision-making – if 
not always their public justification.151 Where decisions are open, where there is 
considerable scope for interpretation, where judges have discretion, this is where 
unconscious biases are most likely to unwittingly exert their potentially discriminatory 
effects.152 This is where decision-making is most vulnerable to departing from the law 
                                                        
149 Perhaps the primary exception are procedures around eyewitness identification, although these are 
often quite dated and not always rigorously followed by investigators. 
150 See discussions of ‘bias cascade’ and ‘bias snowball’ in I. Dror ‘Biases in forensic experts’ (2018) 
360 Science, 243; I. Dror, R. Morgan, C.  Rando, and S. Nakhaeizadeh, ‘The bias snowball and the bias 
cascade effects: Two distinct biases that may impact forensic decision making’ (2017) 62 Journal of 
Forensic Sciences 832. 
151 Decision-making and explaining/rationalizing decisions are fundamentally different activities. 
Biases that influenced decision-making, especially if unconscious, will not necessarily manifest in 
formal decisions and explanations. We should be careful about relying on formal reasons and public 
behavior as proof of judicial impartiality or the impartiality of decisions. 
152 In these interpretatively open circumstances, bias may be difficult to identify, because a range of 
decisions might be available (or seem reasonable). These are sometimes characterised as complex (or 
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(and its egalitarian aspirations) and the relationship between evidence and accurate 
outcomes most strained. This is where decisions might be inconsistent with normative 
expectations and, as in the case of our examples, reality. 
 The advantage of engaging with scientific research and facilitating targeted research 
on our judges is that we might identify or clarify actual abilities and domains where 
judges perform well and perhaps not so well. Where risks seem to be worthy of attention 
we may need to modify procedures. In other cases we may need to be more open and 
transparent and, unless they are supported empirically, begin to dis-assemble the 
institutional, rhetorical and procedural legacies erected around commitment to judicial 
exceptionalism.153 Empirical insights will help us to anticipate risks and focus attention 
rather than rely upon misguided, if well-intentioned, claims about special aptitudes 
associated with declaratory impartiality. That is, traditional legal assertions about 
impartiality decoupled from scientific knowledge. This seems to be preferable to 
persisting with institutionally and professionally convenient myths about judicial 
exceptionalism.154  
 
 
7. Beyond judicial exceptionalism and declaratory impartiality 
In concluding we want to return to the issue of judicial performance in relation to 
cognitive biases. We want to reiterate our apprehension about the longstanding and 
apparently widely held belief that judges are cognitively exceptional. We doubt that, 
through training, experience, aptitude and strength of will, judges are able to resist the 
kinds of conscious and unconscious biases and heuristics that influence and sometimes 
subvert the cognition of other humans – including those selecting musicians, comparing 
fingerprints or undertaking research in biomedicine and physics. Indeed, the available 
evidence reinforces our apprehensions. To support claims about exceptional abilities we 
should expect to see evidence derived from rigorous empirical studies, rather than 
declarations or appeals to controvertible historical performances.155 
 It may be that legal procedures and experience do help judges to resist, to a degree, 
some of the influences that contaminate the cognition of most other humans. Though, 
given the centrality of impartiality to our conception of a judge and institutional 
legitimacy, such abilities should be demonstrable and demonstrated rather than asserted 
(or exempted from scrutiny and review). Abilities cannot be demonstrated through 
appeals to past judicial practice, long traditions of apparent neutrality, the nature of 
judgment, and other evidence that might be considered part of the judicial performance of 
impartiality. These performances, as feminists and other socio-legal scholars have 
repeatedly demonstrated, are open to disruptive counter-interpretations.156  
                                                                                                                                                              
wicked) environments. The fact that a range of interpretations or decisions is available should not be 
understood to mean that biases are not relevant or influential. On such complexity, see R. Hogarth, 
Educating intuition (Chicago Press, 2001). 
153 In terms of testing the evidence, or reviewing the evidence and the reasoning on appeal, we should 
note that conventional methods may not be very effective in relation to bias. Decision-makers should 
probably be less deferential to the softer aspects of decision-making – such as privileging the 
perspective of the those who observed the demeanour of the witness. Alternatively, we might consider 
video recording testimony to enable reviewers to consider some of the evidence for themselves. 
154 Just as judges struggled to acknowledge that they make law, so too they probably struggle to 
acknowledge their biases.  
155 Where data has been collected and analysed (mainly for US judges), it tends to disclose statistically 
significant biases in terms of race and gender. See e.g. Levison and Smith, Implicit racial bias across 
the law and Steikert & Steikert, ‘The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race’. 
156 See e.g. the feminist judging project. 
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 We are committed to preserving the good reputation of our courts and the appearance 
of justice. But we are simultaneously concerned about biases that actually contaminate 
decision-making. To the extent that judges value impartiality, fairness, deciding cases on 
their merits and socio-political legitimacy, there would appear to be a need to learn about 
and respond to biases that threaten these fundamental commitments and expectations. It 
would be curious indeed if judges were apprehensive about the appearance of bias but 
treated biases notorious amongst scientists with indifference or scepticism. If justice 
should not only be seen to be done but, more fundamentally, be done, then judges and 
scientists may need to begin a slow process of dialogue and research in order to better 
understand and perhaps reform the way that our complex societies organise legal practice 
and decision-making.157 Perhaps it is ironic, but in the face of scientific evidence judicial 
ideas about bias are beginning to appear quaint, archaic, naïve, self-serving and in 
consequence biased. 
 
                                                        
157 See R v Sussex Justices Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 and Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 
CLR 488, 492-3. 
